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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s rulings in Hollingsworth v. Perry1 and
United States v. Windsor2 have had profound effects on the lives of
same-sex couples and their families. That is, in California and in
other states (including the District of Columbia) where marriage
between two people of the same sex is legal, citizens now enjoy a
very different legal landscape for their family planning. In my own
life, the federal government can no longer treat my same-sex mar-
riage as less of a marriage than an opposite-sex marriage. Now, my
husband and I can enjoy the panoply of rights—state and federal—
that stem from legal marriage. However, these cases had no effect
on those individuals in U.S. jurisdictions whose laws hold as void
any marriage contracted between parties of the same sex.
† Graduate Fellow, J.D. Candidate 2014, CUNY School of Law. I am grateful to
William Hsiao, whose fearless act of marrying me made this paper possible. Thank
you to Karra Bikson, Lacy Davillier, Ariana Marmora, and my editors, Keith Szczepan-
ski and Cristian Farias, for their help and support throughout this process.
1 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
2 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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The unique status of marriage as a legal institution in the
United States allows for state governments to limit recognition of
marriages performed outside their jurisdictions despite the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.3 Though the typical rules of comity de-
mand that most marriages be recognized as legally valid in a juris-
diction where some marriages would not be valid so long as they
were lawful where they were celebrated,4 a long-standing exception
has existed for marriages that violate the fundamental public policy
of a state being asked to recognize the foreign marriage.5 Some
thirty states have even codified their fundamental public policy op-
position to same-sex marriage as amendments to their state consti-
tutions.6 My home state of Kentucky, for example, incorporated
the following language into its constitution in 2004: “Only a mar-
riage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recog-
nized as a marriage in Kentucky. A legal status identical or
substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals
shall not be valid or recognized.”7
Of all the interesting questions that Hollingsworth and Windsor
left unanswered about my marriage, then, the principal one to me
is: What would my being married to a man in New York mean if I
ever returned to Kentucky? The easy answer seems to be that my
marriage would be meaningless; in Kentucky, it would be as
though I were not married at all because I am not married to a
woman. This apparently easy answer led me to think of a bizarre
question: Does that mean I would have the right to be legally mar-
ried to a woman in Kentucky? This question, though it may seem
silly at first blush, is by no means new.8 However, the question has
not yet been critically analyzed. With recent decisions that impli-
cate the rights of marriage in America—and that bring directly
3 Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions:
A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV 2143, 2146–47 (2005). See also U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 1.
4 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1971).
5 Id. § 283(2); Beddow v. Beddow, 257 S.W.2d 45, 47–48 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952).
6 See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 203–04 (2d Cir. 2012) (Straub, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part).
7 KY. CONST. § 233A.
8 See, e.g., Richard Cook, Comment, Kansas’s Defense of Marriage Amendment: The
Problematic Consequences of a Blanket Nonrecognition Rule on Kansas Law, 54 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1165 (2006) (suggesting problems that could occur if Kansas did not recognize
foreign marriages between same-sex partners); Michael J. Kanotz, Comment, For Better
or for Worse: A Critical Analysis of Florida’s Defense of Marriage Act, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
439 (1998) (analyzing what same-sex marriages, which were expected to begin occur-
ring in Hawaii after Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), would mean under
Florida law).
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into question whether and to what extent any marriage must be
recognized under the Constitution—we are in a critical historical
moment where figuring out what it means to be queer in America
not only implicates navigating the socio-legal structure that binds
queer lives and identities, but also requires that conscientious work
be done in determining the limits of that structure. After all, what
takes precedence—opposite-sex marriage, with its status as a funda-
mental right, or my skim-milk marriage to a man?9
In this Note, I will examine what might happen to me if I were
to move back to Lexington, Kentucky—the city of my birth—and
apply for a marriage license with a woman. Would I be turned away
for being currently married to a man? Would what I seek to do be
criminal under Kentucky law? If so, would I have the right to com-
pel the issuance of such a marriage license, despite the validity of
my marriage in New York, or to stop criminal proceedings on con-
stitutional grounds? These questions may seem silly, but the princi-
ples behind them have a very real importance for what it means to
be married in America, where fundamentally irreconcilable state
laws control our legal status.
I. NON-RECOGNITION OF MARITAL STATUS: IS MY INVALID
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AN IMPEDIMENT TO
OPPOSITE-SEX MARRIAGE?
Kentucky law prohibits many types of marriages.10 Amid these,
the law specifically states that marriage is “prohibited and void . . .
[w]here there is a husband or wife living, from whom the person
marrying has not been divorced.”11 Kentucky’s law, finicky though
one might expect it to be about such dickered terms, is surprisingly
silent as to what a husband or a wife is. But Black’s Law Dictionary tells
9 See Oral Argument at 71:15–16, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No.
12-307), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio
_detail.aspx?argument=12-307&TY=2012 (audio of Justice Ginsburg’s comment to at-
torney Paul Clement, who defended the Defense of Marriage Act before the Supreme
Court, in which she rhetorically referred to same-sex marriage as “skim-milk
marriage”).
10 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.010 (West, WestlawNext through the end of
the 2013 regular session and the 2013 extraordinary session) (prohibiting and voiding
marriages between any people with a half- or whole-blood relationship of closer than
second cousins); id. § 402.020 (prohibiting and voiding marriages where one of the
parties has been declared mentally disabled by a court, when not solemnized or con-
tracted in the presence of an authorized solemnizing person or body, between mem-
bers of the same sex, between more than two persons, and—with certain exceptions—
with a person under sixteen years of age).
11 Id. § 402.020(1)(b).
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us that husband means a married man and wife a married woman.12
Thus, to determine if I could get married to a woman in Kentucky
despite my being married to a man, I would need to determine if I
have a husband as that term is used in Kentucky law. For this I turn
to Kentucky’s legal definition of marriage to determine if my hus-
band, or I, qualify as married.
Luckily, for the definition of marriage, Kentucky has a statute
on point:
As used and recognized in the law of the Commonwealth, “mar-
riage” refers only to the civil status, condition, or relation of one
(1) man and one (1) woman united in law for life, for the dis-
charge to each other and the community of the duties legally
incumbent upon those whose association is founded on the dis-
tinction of sex.13
This definition is essentially adopted from case law in which
Kentucky’s highest court upheld a county clerk’s determination de-
nying two women a marriage license, not because a statute forbade
it—or even defined marriage at all—but because the union they
were seeking as members of the same sex did not meet the com-
mon dictionary definition of marriage.14 For this reason, my hus-
band and I, under Kentucky law, fail to meet the legal standard for
married. Our civil status as married is not predicated on being one
man and one woman. Our association is therefore not even
founded on the distinction of sex,15 a basic requirement of the civil
status of married in Kentucky. As expected, my marriage in New
York does not meet the definition of marriage in Kentucky.
The Commonwealth’s Office of the Attorney General gives
further guidance on the issue. In a 2007 opinion essentially forbid-
ding the public university system from giving domestic partner
benefits to same-sex partners on constitutional grounds, the Office
stated: “We believe a substantially correct statement of the [law re-
lating to status] is that the law of the state where the marriage is
consummated establishes the ‘relationship’ of one to the other as
12 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 637 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “husband”); id. at 1370
(defining “wife”).
13 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.005 (West, WestlawNext through the end of the 2013
regular session and the 2013 extraordinary session).
14 Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589–90 (Ky. 1973). Now that the state consti-
tution and statutes explicitly adopt the Black’s Law definition cited in Jones, a court
may find itself hard-pressed to deviate from this precedent. The Black’s Law definition
of marriage, for its part, has been updated to “[t]he legal union of a couple as
spouses.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1059 (9th ed. 2009).
15 For purposes of this Note, we can at least assume that Kentucky intended “dis-
tinction of sex” to mean a gender binary of male as distinguished from female.
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husband and wife . . . which is universally recognized . . . .”16 Does
this imply that Kentucky recognizes my husband’s status as my hus-
band by grace of our New York marriage, though Kentucky at-
taches no rights to his status since it otherwise considers our
marriage void? It seems not, because the Office goes on to state
that, under Kentucky’s constitutional marriage amendment, “only
marriage as defined in Kentucky law . . . shall be valid or recog-
nized as a legal status.”17 Therefore, the existence of our marital
relationship, in New York, is probably not cognizable as a legal sta-
tus for the purpose of Kentucky law.
Further examination of Kentucky’s marriage laws supports this
conclusion. A statute provides that marriages between members of
the same sex are against Kentucky public policy;18 such a marriage
occurring in another jurisdiction is void in Kentucky, and “[a]ny
rights granted by virtue of the marriage . . . shall be unenforceable
in Kentucky courts.”19 To the question of whether I am a married
man for the purposes of Kentucky law, there can be little doubt:
the answer is no.
However, in order to prevent my marriage to a woman, Ken-
tucky may be able to recognize my husband and my status as mar-
ried via a legal fiction. In a recent child custody case, the Court of
Appeals overturned a family court’s decision to use the legal fiction
that a same-sex couple was married for the purposes of naming one
member of the couple a legal stepparent.20 The Court of Appeals
found this to be an inappropriate derogation from the very clear
meaning of Kentucky’s bans on same-sex marriage.21 The court
reasoned that a legal fiction so blatantly at odds with the express
words of the General Assembly and the Constitution would only
have been appropriate if it were necessary to stop an “absurd and
unworkable” result from occurring that would be directly at odds
with Kentucky public policy.22 No precedent exists to give an idea
of whether having a legal marriage in Kentucky while also having a
16 Op. Att’y Gen. Ky. on State Health Insurance Coverage for Domestic Partners,
OAG 07-004, 3 (2007), available at http://ag.ky.gov/civil/opinions/2007/oag0704
.doc (analyzing whether a state university’s offering of health insurance coverage for
“domestic partners” to its employees violates Section 233A of the Kentucky
Constitution).
17 Id. at 5.
18 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.040(2) (West, WestlawNext through the end of the
2013 regular session and the 2013 extraordinary session).
19 Id. § 402.045(1)–(2).
20 S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804, 816 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).
21 Id. at 818.
22 Id.
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void marriage there that is valid in another state qualifies as an
absurd and unworkable result for the purposes of Kentucky’s do-
mestic relations law. As such, it is unclear whether a court would
allow a legal fiction to be used to recognize my husband and I as
married for the purposes of preventing me from having two active
marriages, even though one would be void in Kentucky.
Assuming I am not (at least fictionally) a married man under
Kentucky law, then I am not anyone’s husband there. If I am not
anyone’s husband, then neither is my husband—his being a mar-
ried man is conditional on his being married to me, after all.
Therefore, under Kentucky’s law, I must not have a husband living.
So long as the woman I would marry is no more closely related to
me than a second cousin,23 has not been adjudged mentally dis-
abled,24 is over eighteen years of age,25 and—of course—is not
married (to a man) herself,26 we should be legally entitled to a
Kentucky marriage license.
Applying for a marriage license in Kentucky requires appli-
cants to appear at the relevant county clerk’s office,27 pay a fee,28
and fill out a form that includes, among other things, information
about the applicant’s marital status.29 The form requires the parties
to certify that the information they provide on the form is true.30
Were I to fill out this form, I would note that I am currently mar-
ried in New York to a man. Considering the criminal penalties, in-
cluding the loss of office, that can be assessed against a county
clerk who knowingly issues a license forbidden by Kentucky law,31 a
county clerk would most likely resolve the doubt in her favor and
deny my application for a marriage license in light of the fact that I
am a party to another, even if void, marriage. However, presuming
a county clerk did issue the license to me, and my marriage were
23 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.010(1) (West, WestlawNext through the end of the
2013 regular session and the 2013 extraordinary session).
24 Id. § 402.020(1)(a).
25 Id. § 402.020(1)(f).
26 Id. § 402.020(1)(b).
27 Id. § 402.080 (granting power to a county clerk to issue marriage license).
28 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 64.012(19) (West, WestlawNext through the end of the
2013 regular session and the 2013 extraordinary session) (setting the fee for process-
ing a marriage license).
29 Id. § 402.100(1)(b) (requiring each county clerk to use a uniform form that
requires the parties’ vital information, including marital condition).
30 Commonwealth of Kentucky Marriage License, Meade Cnty. Clerk, available at
http://countyclerk.meadecounty.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/34E65687-7BE5-405D-8A4F-
636E01AACA16/0/Marriage_License.pdf.
31 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.990(6)–(8) (West, WestlawNext through the end of
the 2013 regular session and the 2013 extraordinary session).
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solemnized properly,32 would my legal problems end there?
II. BIGAMY: IS MY PROHIBITED AND VOID MARRIAGE
THE BASIS FOR A FELONY?33
In Kentucky, bigamy is the felony of marrying someone while
knowing that one already has a husband or wife.34 The current def-
inition of this crime is most likely an adaptation of the correspond-
ing section of the Model Penal Code.35 An essential element of
bigamy, which Kentucky must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, is
that the defendant was validly married when the second marriage
occurred.36 While some commenters take for granted that this bur-
den to prove a valid predicate marriage would prevent a state with
a marriage-defining amendment such as Kentucky’s from convict-
ing a bigamist whose first marriage was to a same-sex partner in
another state,37 that proposition is not supported by the law.
The logically correct answer is that husband or wife as used in
the criminal definition of bigamy must be controlled by the same
meaning of marriage that would control for the invalidity of my New
York marriage. How could it be that, if marriage were defined in
Kentucky’s Constitution and statutes as only a marriage between a
man and a woman, the criminal law could recognize an out-of-state
same-sex marriage as a valid marriage?
Kentucky criminal law is subject to the canon of construction
that its provisions be liberally construed according to “the fair im-
port of their terms . . . and to effect the objects of the law.”38 Thus,
a court would have an easier time relying on a legal fiction of my
New York marriage, of the type discussed above, to contradict the
plain meaning of the Kentucky Constitution and statutory regime.
However, a court may not even need to fictionalize my marriage, as
it would also have a long history of common law rules that support
32 Id. § 402.010(1)(c).
33 Throughout, I use the words bigamy or polygamy to refer only to crimes so titled
by law.
34 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.010(1)(a).
35 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.1 (1962). Kentucky overhauled its criminal law in
light of the Model Penal Code effective in 1975. See Paul H. Robinson & Markus Dirk
Dubber, An Introduction to the Model Penal Code 5 (Mar. 12, 1999), https://www
.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf. Kentucky’s current definition
of bigamy became effective on January 1, 1975. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.010.
36 Tharp v. Commonwealth, 45 S.W.2d 480, 482 (Ky. 1932).
37 Cook, supra note 8, at 1187–88; Kanotz, supra note 8, at 461.
38 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500.030 (West, WestlawNext through the end of the 2013
regular session and the 2013 extraordinary session).
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the notion that establishing the validity of a predicate out-of-state
marriage is an issue of fact and not an issue of law.
If the predicate marriage for a bigamy prosecution occurred
outside the state of prosecution, the validity of the marriage is an
issue of fact: All that need be proved is that the marriage in fact
took place and that such a marriage is in fact valid under the for-
eign law.39 While this rule is old, it is still regarded as the valid
common law rule by authoritative treatises.40 If Kentucky courts ad-
here to the canon of construction that they are meant to give full
effect to the objects of the law, adhering to a well-established doc-
trine that a foreign marriage need only to have been a valid mar-
riage in the place where it was celebrated would foreclose the
defense that the Kentucky Constitution precludes recognition of
my same-sex marriage for any purpose, even in a criminal case for
bigamy.
However, Kentucky’s criminal bigamy statute contains a de-
fense to the charge: the defendant believed he was legally eligible
to remarry.41 This defense specifically includes the belief that the
predicate marriage was void.42 At common law, this defense was
not possible, as it was considered an impermissible mistake of law
defense.43 How this defense would work in Kentucky in light of its
statutory and constitutional limitations on the definitions of mar-
riage is unclear.44
39 People v. Lambert, 5 Mich. 349, 363 (1858). Also relevant is Apkins v. Common-
wealth,147 S.W. 376, 378 (Ky. 1912), where Kentucky’s highest court opined that proof
that the predicate Illinois marriage was void under the laws of that state would have
been a sufficient defense to an indictment for contracting a bigamous marriage in
Kentucky. However, if a valid foreign marriage would be void because the parties were
married in the foreign jurisdiction to evade the marriage laws of their domicile, then
that marriage could not be the predicate marriage for a bigamy prosecution. State v.
Fenn, 92 P. 417, 417–19 (Wash. 1907).
40 See, e.g., 11 AM. JUR. 2D Bigamy § 4 (2013); 2 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S
CRIMINAL LAW § 232 (15th ed. 2013).
41 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.010(2) (West, WestlawNext through the end of the
2013 regular session and the 2013 extraordinary session).
42 See id., Ky. Crime Comm’n cmt.
43 See Staley v. State, 131 N.W. 1028, 1029–30 (Neb. 1911). In Staley, the defendant
entered into a marriage that was valid in Iowa. He then returned to Nebraska and,
after consultation with several lawyers who made him believe that his Iowa marriage
would be void in Nebraska, remarried there. His belief that his Iowa marriage was
void in Nebraska was no defense to a charge of bigamy, as this was merely a mistake of
law defense.
44 The most recent reported case noting a bigamy prosecution in Kentucky is Hol-
lingsworth v. Commonwealth, No. 2005-CA-001217-MR, 2007 WL 1207118 (Ky. Ct. App.
Apr. 20, 2007). Before that, the most recent case was Carroll v. Commonwealth, 202
S.W.2d 404 (Ky. 1947), which predates the adoption of this defense to bigamy and it
deals with issues surrounding burdens of proof.
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III. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO OPPOSITE-SEX MARRIAGE:
HOW MUCH CAN KENTUCKY INTERFERE?
Whether I were denied or granted a marriage license to a wo-
man, I might run into legal problems giving rise to a constitutional
claim. Could I have a court compel the county clerk to issue me the
license? (The denial of a marriage license, at least theoretically,
gives rise to a claim for injunctive relief of that nature.45) Could I
have a court enjoin Kentucky from prosecuting me under its big-
amy laws for exercising my fundamental right to marry a woman in
these circumstances? At first, it seems these questions would arise
under different constitutional theories, but the history of the right
to marriage as a constitutional question shows the analysis is much
more unified.
Loving v. Virginia,46 in which the Supreme Court established
the fundamental right to enter into opposite-sex marriages,47 was a
challenge to the constitutionality of Virginia’s criminal prohibi-
tions against its residents entering into interracial marriages in
other states.48 The Court recognized, as did the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia in upholding the law, the white-supremacist
policies behind these criminal “evasion” laws for interracial couples
were the same as those that held such marriages void for civil pur-
poses.49 Of course, Loving did not just invalidate criminal marriage
evasion statutes as applied to interracial couples: it invalidated the
civil prohibitions on interracial marriage that were premised on
the same policies and similarly interfered with the fundamental
right to enter into opposite-sex marriage. Given this precedent, ei-
ther the denial of a marriage license or a prosecution for bigamy
may be analyzed under the same standard.
Under the Kentucky Constitution, no government official may
exercise “arbitrary power” over the “lives, liberty and property of
freemen.”50 The constitution equally guarantees that “no grant of
45 This was, after all, the remedy sought in Jones v. Hallahan. See 501 S.W.2d 588,
589 (Ky. 1973).
46 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
47 Id. at 12.
48 See id. at 2–7.
49 The Loving Court cites to Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), where the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that denying the validity of the North
Carolina marriage of a white man and a woman whom the court describes only as “a
Chinese” for its miscegenetic character did not violate federal constitutional guaran-
tees of equal protection or due process. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7.
50 KY. CONST. § 2. See also Kentucky Milk Marketing & Antimonopoly Comm’n v.
Kroger Co., 691 S.W.2d 893, 899 (Ky. 1985) (explaining that Article 2’s restriction of
exercises of arbitrary power binds all public officials exercising their political powers,
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exclusive, separate public emoluments or privileges shall be made
to any man or set of men.”51 While these are guarantees of equal
protection and due process generally, they also represent substan-
tive rights that go beyond what the federal Constitution recognizes:
in fact, Kentucky courts have often been at the forefront of recog-
nizing substantive rights and stopping the Commonwealth from in-
terfering with the lives of its citizens.52
However, in recent years, the Kentucky Supreme Court has
held that, in reviewing Kentucky laws for their constitutionality
under Kentucky’s equal protection guarantees for denials of a fun-
damental right, the same rules of constitutional scrutiny that would
apply under the relevant federal constitutional law apply in Ken-
tucky.53 In any event, the Kentucky Constitution can guarantee no
fewer rights than the federal Constitution.54 While all states have a
nearly plenary power to determine marital status within their bor-
ders, these regulations of marriage must comport with the federal
Constitution.55
It is axiomatic that the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal
Constitution contains a fundamental and individual right to marry
one person of the opposite sex.56 This right is both a substantive
due process right and an associational right under the First
Amendment incorporated via the Fourteenth, though the standard
of review under either theory is, apparently, the same.57 In review-
ing a state’s interference with the right to marry one opposite-sex
partner under the Fourteenth Amendment, a court must deter-
mine whether the interference is a “direct and substantial burden”
and that this provision encompasses a guarantee of due process and equal protection
of law).
51 KY. CONST. § 3. See also Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Cheyenne Res, Inc., 163 S.W.3d
408, 418–19 (Ky. 2005) (noting that Kentucky’s guarantees of equal protection can
require higher scrutiny than similar federal standards because of the breadth of Sec-
tion 3 and its support in other sections of the Kentucky Constitution).
52 For a glowing review of Kentucky’s track record on this issue, see the majority
opinion in Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (holding that laws
outlawing deviate sexual intercourse were a violation of Kentuckians’ rights against
arbitrary power and to equal protection of laws, even if the federal Constitution did
not embrace that right).
53 Commonwealth v. Howard, 969 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Ky. 1998).
54 Wasson, 842 S.W.2d, at 492. See also Maxwell’s Pic-Pac, Inc. v. Dehner, 887 F.
Supp. 2d 733, 752 (W.D. Ky. 2012) (holding that a law that violates the federal Equal
Protection Clause would fail Kentucky’s standards for equal protection in Article 3 of
the Kentucky Constitution).
55 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691.
56 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (characterizing marriage as one of the
basic civil rights of man and a “fundamental freedom”).
57 Montgomery v. Carr, 101 F.3d 1117, 1124 (6th Cir. 1996).
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on that right to marry.58 If the state’s interference rises to this level,
a reviewing court will presume the interference is unconstitutional
“unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and
is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.”59 If the inter-
ference does not rise to that level, the interference will only be
held unconstitutional if it cannot survive rational basis review.60
The Sixth Circuit’s conception of a “direct and substantial bur-
den” on the right to marriage is an absolute bar to marriage based
on a suspect classification (such as the criminal statute struck down
in Loving) or where the state places such a financial or legal bur-
den on individuals who wish to marry that they will probably never
be able to get married, even if they theoretically could.61 Thus,
mere economic disincentives to marry a particular person or finan-
cial burdens incident to being married, such as disqualifications
for social welfare or for public employment based on being in or
entering into a marital relationship, do not rise to the level of “di-
rect and substantial” burden.62
In my case, the county clerk would have refused to issue my
marriage license or I would have been prosecuted for bigamy
based on my marital status under New York law. Assuming I were
living in Kentucky with my husband and my opposite-sex fiancée, I
would not have a right to get a divorce in New York63 or to have my
New York marriage dissolved or invalidated by a Kentucky court.64
58 Id. (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978)). In Zablocki, Wisconsin
forbade anyone who owed money under a child support judgment from being remar-
ried unless the debtor both paid the amount owed and had a court clear the impedi-
ment by order. 434 U.S. at 375. The Supreme Court found that restriction interfered
directly and substantially with the right to marry. Id. at 388–391.
59 Montgomery, 101 F.3d at 1124. See also Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388.
60 Montgomery, 101 F.3d at 1124.
61 Id. at 1124–25.
62 Id. at 1125–26.
63 New York law requires at least a year of continuous residency for one of the
parties prior to the commencement of a divorce action of a New York marriage. N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 230 (McKinney, WestlawNext through L. 2014, ch. 1 to 2).
64 Courts in Kentucky may only grant divorces to married couples. KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 403.140(1) (West, WestlawNext through the end of the 2013 regular session
and the 2013 extraordinary session). The statute provides that a Kentucky circuit
court may declare a marriage invalid, or grant an annulment, where “[t]he marriage
is prohibited.” Id. § 403.120(1)(c). While the language of the statute is ambiguous as
to whether that includes marriages that are void and prohibited (like a marriage
where both parties are of the same sex), the statute is construed to reach such mar-
riages. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 610 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980). However, it is
not clear whether Kentucky’s constitutional and statutory definition of marriage as
extending only to relationships where the parties are opposite-sex would control in
the applicability of the word marriage as used in this jurisdictional statute to exclude
my marriage as eligible for this invalidation. Would a court apply the law of New York
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Just as in Zablocki, where the plaintiffs could only theoretically have
cleared the impediment to marriage by paying back money and
obtaining a court order, the process of changing my marital status
in New York would be so burdensome as to be nearly impossible.
My husband and I would have to move to a jurisdiction that recog-
nizes our New York marriage as a marriage for the purposes of ob-
taining the divorce. We would need to reside there long enough to
establish the required residency and to see through the divorce
proceedings. This process would require the entire uprooting of
our lives in Kentucky and starting new (though perhaps tempo-
rary) lives in another state. This process could feasibly take years,
and at unknowable costs.
The criminal and civil interferences with my right to marry in
Kentucky would be, practically speaking, unavoidable. Unlike eco-
nomic disincentives to marry a particular person, my case would
present a situation where my same-sex marriage, void in the state I
am living in and to which no state rights attach, would be all but
irreversible, depriving me of the fundamental right to enter into
an opposite-sex marriage or attaching severe criminal penalties to
my exercise of that right. While it is true that any Kentucky man
seeking to marry a woman while he is still legally married to a wo-
man in another state would be expected to get a divorce, I would
have no practicable access to divorce as a means to exercise my
right to marry a woman like any other Kentucky man can. Thus,
Zablocki would require that Kentucky’s denial of my new marriage
license or prosecution of me for bigamy be presumed to violate my
constitutional right to opposite-sex marriage, unless Kentucky
to govern the definition of marriage for the limited purpose of granting us an annul-
ment effective in Kentucky? Especially since Kentucky courts are forbidden to give any
of the rights arising out of marriage “or its termination” to same-sex couples, the
answer is even more muddled. Cf. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.045(1). This problem is
not limited to Kentucky; several states’ provisions limiting the definition of valid mar-
riages to opposite-sex parties may have the effect of keeping same-sex couples, mar-
ried in another state, from changing their legal status at all. See generally Elisabeth
Oppenheimer, No Exit: The Problem of Same-Sex Divorce, 90 N.C. L. REV. 73 (2011); Col-
leen McNichols Ramais, Note, ‘Til Death Do You Part . . . and This Time We Mean It:
Denial of Access to Divorce for Same-Sex Couples, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1013 (2010). At any
rate, Kentucky’s circuit court jurisdiction for the invalidation of a marriage made pro-
hibited and void by Kentucky law extends only to the parties to the marriage and is
limited in time to within a year of the filing party’s having learned of the impediment.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.120(2)(b). Though I have no citation for it, my husband
and I learned of each other’s being male much longer than a year ago. As such, it
seems that we would not be entitled to an annulment in Kentucky regardless of the
question of the meaning of marriage in the jurisdictional statute.
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could show the interference protected sufficiently important state
interests and is closely tailored to protect only those interests.
A. Kentucky’s Potential Interests in Preventing an Opposite-Sex
Marriage
As in all heightened constitutional scrutiny analyses, Kentucky
would be required to offer reasons for its interference with my
right to opposite-sex marriage based on my void-and-unavoidable
same-sex marital status.65 The Commonwealth would likely offer
different arguments from those that same-sex marriage opponents
would offer.66 After all, I would be trying to marry a woman, not a
man. Instead, the Commonwealth’s reasons would likely be the ar-
guments that are used to justify the prohibitions on plural mar-
riage as a restriction in opposite-sex marriage.
In recent cases, state and federal courts have reviewed prohibi-
tions on plural marriage for their constitutionality under various
theories.67 All of these cases start from the premise that the Su-
preme Court has ruled, and regularly affirmed, that Congress’s
prohibition of plural marriage in the territories of the United
65 See Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scru-
tiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 359 (2006).
66 Such arguments are well known, and they seem to mostly focus on the protec-
tion of the definition of marriage and promotion of procreation. See, e.g., Conaway v.
Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 630 (Md. 2007); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 16–17
(N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King Co. 138 P.3d 963, 981–83 (Wash. 2006); Morrison v.
Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 22–25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 221 (N.J. 2006).
67 Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1110–13 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that
parties seeking to compel the issuance of a marriage license for a plural marriage did
not have standing to challenge Utah’s criminal bigamy statute because they could not
establish the license would insulate them from prosecution); Potter v. Murray City,
760 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1985) (finding a “network” of Utah laws based on
monogamy and the deep tradition of monogamy in American society as compelling
state interests to limit plural marriage); State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 742–45 (Utah
2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1252 (2007) (holding that Utah’s criminalization of lead-
ing a plural-married life while only being legally married to one spouse was supported
by compelling interests); State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 829–30 (Utah 2004) (refusing to
review Utah’s bans on plural marriage under strict scrutiny because those claims were
not properly pleaded, but upholding those bans under rational basis review); State v.
Fischer, 199 P.3d 663, 666–70 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a defendant was not
denied constitutional rights when he had not been entitled to the spousal defense in
a proceeding for statutory rape on the theory that the girl he had had sex with was his
celestial wife based on their plural marriage); but see Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp.
2d 1170, 1217–25 (D. Utah 2013) (holding that Utah’s prohibition on merely pur-
porting to be married to multiple people was a facial violation of the Free Exercise
Clause and the substantive due process right described in Lawrence v. Texas). These
cases show state-interest reasoning that flows from both the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
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States was not violative of the federal Constitution.68 Even in the
Zablocki opinion, the Court tends to agree that a state can legiti-
mately outlaw plural marriages.69
The various reasons the Supreme Court gives to prohibit plu-
ral marriage in Reynolds v. United States include that this restriction
vindicates a longstanding tradition in Anglo-American law against
permitting plural marriage, that plural marriage causes patriarchal
despotism incompatible with American civil society, and that plural
marriage is more suited to “African” and “Asiatic” life.70 In State v.
Green, the Supreme Court of Utah analyzed and approved the
state’s putatively compelling reasons for outlawing plural marriage:
the vast network of legal rights premised on monogamous mar-
riage,71 preventing marital fraud and misuse of state benefits asso-
ciated with marriage,72 and protecting “vulnerable individuals”
(women and children) from “[c]rimes not unusually attendant to
68 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878); see also Potter, 760 F.2d at
1069–70 (showing how frequently the Court has affirmed Reynolds). Congress would
proceed not only to criminalize plural marriages in the territories, but would go on to
enact laws that stripped the Church of Latter-Day Saints of its corporate status and
seized its property. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 66 (1890) (upholding the statute). After the Church aban-
doned plural marriage as a tenet of the faith, Congress returned the property it had
seized to the Church. See S. REP. NO. 95-1275, at 2 (1978). The federal bans on plural
marriage were repealed in 1978. Act of Nov. 2, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-584, 92 Stat. 2483.
Congress repealed its criminal bans on plural marriage as part of repealing the law
that allowed for seizures from churches in the territories because, as the sponsors of
the repeal argued, those laws were “antiquated and constitutionally suspect.” 124
CONG. REC. 23816, 23895 (1978) (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini). The Office
of the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior even opined that the Supreme
Court might find these laws unconstitutional because Congress had clearly put them
forward only to harm Mormons and had stopped enforcing the law since the Church
disavowed plural marriage. S. REP. NO. 95-1275, at 6–7 (1978). However, the Commit-
tee on Energy and National Resources clarified in approving the repeal of the laws
criminalizing plural marriage federally that it did not intend to express a lack of sup-
port for such bans generally. Id. at 3. Concordantly, regulations from the Bureau of
Indian Affairs still prohibit and void any marriages that are celebrated before the
dissolution of either party’s former marriage. 25 C.F.R. § 11.603(1)(a) (2013). How-
ever, tribes may use their powers to regulate domestic relations to permit marriages
made void by this regulation. Law and Order on Indian Reservations, 58 Fed. Reg.
54406, 54409 (Oct. 21, 1993).
69 “Surely, for example, a State may legitimately say that no one can marry his or
her sibling, that no one can marry who is not at least 14 years old, that no one can
marry without first passing an examination for venereal disease, or that no one can
marry who has a living husband or wife.” Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 392 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring). However, on the same page, Justice Stewart disagreed with the majority that
there was a constitutional right to marriage, calling it a privilege. Id.
70 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164–66.
71 99 P.3d at 830.
72 Id.
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the practice of polygamy,” including incest, sexual assault, statutory
rape, and failure to pay child support.73 Two years later, the same
court, in light of Lawrence v. Texas,74 upheld Utah’s criminal ban on
living as though married to multiple partners, citing the compel-
ling interest of protecting minors from exploitation and protecting
the public institution of marriage from private behavior that would
harm it.75
Courts have moved away from the bare assertions in Reynolds
that plural marriage’s African, Asiatic, and despotic characteristics
were enough to justify banning it, advancing toward a less moralis-
tic—and more compelling—analysis focused on protecting wo-
men, children, and marriage itself.76 But does this shift represent a
genuine change in policy and reasoning behind these bans?
This change in analysis occurs, maybe coincidentally, after the
establishment of the constitutional principle that a mere moral
aversion or a simple desire to cause harm to a group are no longer
recognized as valid state interests.77 Dictum from the Windsor case
even implies that protecting the definition of marriage itself is not
a legitimate governmental interest, because it manifests a bare de-
sire to harm a particular group based on moral aversion.78 Recent
73 Id. Here, the court cites to Richard A. Vazquez, The Practice of Polygamy: Legitimate
Free Exercise of Religion or Legitimate Public Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in Light of Modern
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 225, 239–45 (2001). Mr.
Vazquez takes the position that courts have done an “unsatisfactory job” of establish-
ing that the state has a compelling interest in limiting plural marriage and should
move away from moralistic arguments toward arguments about protecting women
and children. Id. at 253.
74 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
75 State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 742–45 (Utah 2006). The Utah Supreme Court
noted that these were two legitimate interests in limiting consensual sexual behavior
specifically recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Lawrence.
76 See cf. Vazquez, supra note 73.
77 This principle, established in U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528 (1973), can be generally stated as a “bare congressional desire to harm” a particu-
lar group in exercising its rights is not a legitimate governmental interest, even under
the low standards of rational basis review. Id. at 534–35. This doctrine has been ap-
plied to strike down laws that rest on “irrational” prejudices. City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (invalidating a zoning ordinance that
was suspected of resting on a bare desire to harm and exclude people with intellectual
disabilities). The doctrine protects against state statutes that single out a particular
minority group for broad legal disabilities. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
It has been extended to insulate private, consensual sexual relationships between
adults from criminal laws founded only on moral disapproval of those relationships
and the people most likely to engage in them. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583. It now also
applies where Congress’s intent in passing a law is to harm a group based on moral
disapproval of the exercise of one of its rights under state law. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at
2693–94.
78 Windsor uses evidence that the House of Representatives’ legislative intent in-
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scholarship, even when it argues contra plural marriage recogni-
tion and decriminalization, details a history demonstrating that
American prohibitions on plural marriage were strengthened, or
even adopted, in order to express moral opposition to plural mar-
riage and harm groups who practiced it.79 In fact, much like the
climate of suppressing same-sex marriages behind the Defense of
Marriage Act a century later,80 Congress’s 19th-century assertion of
its right to regulate some aspects of the family, despite the tradi-
tional state-law character of that body of law, was explicitly borne of
the desire to eradicate the Mormon practice of plural marriage to
safeguard the institution of marriage and an amorphous concept
of national virtue.81
To no small extent, this idea of national virtue revolved
around protecting what a moral American (i.e., white and Chris-
tian) life looks like from the perceived threat of multiculturalism.82
In refusing to recognize a validly celebrated out-of-state miscege-
netic marriage, when such a marriage would be void under its law,
the Tennessee Supreme Court famously ruled that to do otherwise
could leave Tennessee in a situation where “[t]he Turk or Moham-
medan, with his numerous wives, may establish his harem at the
doors of the capitol,” calling such a situation “revolting” and “un-
cluded the protection of traditional marriage from “homosexual couples” and their
efforts to redefine marriage to sustain the Court’s proposition that the Defense of
Marriage Act’s definition of marriage was adopted with inimical intent to harm same-
sex couples who were validly married under state law. 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
79 See Catherine Blake, Case Note, I Pronounce You Husband and Wife and Wife and
Wife: The Utah Supreme Court’s Re-Affirmation of Anti-Polygamy Laws in Utah v. Green, 7
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 405, 412–13 (2005); Cassiah M. Ward, Note, I Now Pronounce You
Husband and Wives: Lawrence v. Texas and the Practice of Polygamy in Modern America, 11
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 131, 135–38 (2004); see also Vazquez, supra note 73, at
227–32.
80 The parallels between, and the possibility of distinguishing, the moral disap-
proval of same-sex marriage and plural marriage led to much ado at the time of the
passage of the Defense of Marriage Act. David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex
Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 55–60 (1997).
81 Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297,
1357–65 (1998).
82 Reynolds itself corroborates this with its focus on the “African and Asiatic” nature
of plural marriage, which was a practice “odious” to countries in Europe’s north and
west, in holding that Mormon plural marriage was a major deviation from the well-
established norms of Anglo-American society not worth protecting constitutionally as
a religious practice. 98 U.S. at 164–65. Congress seemed to agree when it passed its
ban on plural marriage in the territories in 1862, arguing just two years earlier that
the Framers of the Constitution “surely . . . never intended that the wild vagaries of
the Hindoo or the ridiculous mummeries of the Hottentot should be ennobled” by
the protection of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion. H.R. REP. NO.
83, at 2 (1860).
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natural.”83 Plural marriage “was natural for people of color, but
unnatural for White Americans of Northern European descent” be-
ing white and plurally married was to become non-white.84
By contrast, state and federal governments as a matter of
course recognized plural marriages as valid for both state and fed-
eral law purposes when they were validly contracted among Native
Americans on their tribal lands in accordance with tribal customs,
even when they would not recognize plural marriages occurring in
other nations among those who later took up residence in the
United States.85 Courts also found ways to deal with the rights ema-
nating from validly contracted plural marriages—so long as no one
had to suffer the affront of normalized non-monogamous cohabita-
tion.86 Thus, while states and the federal government railed against
recognizing plural marriages, they found ways to handle the occa-
sional plural marriage and accorded rights to all the parties to it, so
long as it was properly confined and could not pose a threat to
public morals by seeming, for lack of a better word, normal.
The Reynolds Court found that criminalization and restriction
of plural marriage in America vindicated the Anglo-American
moral tradition preexisting the adoption of the federal Bill of
Rights.87 The European history of the criminalization of bigamy,
which flipped between a civil (i.e., criminal) and ecclesiastical of-
fense, gives insight into the original moralizing function of those
laws.88 Bigamy became a civil offense in England and the United
83 State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9, 11 (1872). (To be fair, the court was characterizing
plural marriage as revolting and unnatural along with interracial and incestuous mar-
riage.) Whether the court conceived of “Turks” and “Mohammedans” as white is diffi-
cult to say. John Tehranian, Compulsory Whiteness: Towards a Middle-Eastern Legal
Scholarship, 82 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (2007), discusses the “catch-22” of the simultaneous white-
ness and racial othering that characterizes the Middle-Eastern and Arab experience in
America much better than I ever could.
84 Martha M. Ertman, Race Treason: The Untold Story of America’s Ban on Polygamy, 19
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 287, 289 (2010).
85 See Mark P. Strasser, Tribal Marriages, Same-Sex Unions, and an Interstate Recognition
Conundrum, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 207, 207–29 (2010).
86 Common law courts all over the world, even in the United States, recognized
that so long as the plurally married foreigner (who is assumed to be non-white) were
merely passing through, and the public policy of the state were not burdened by the
prolonged cohabitation of the members of the multiparty marriage, or so long as the
marriage’s validity were limited to rights like succession, then there should be no
reason to hold the marriage invalid. See the discussion in In re Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate,
188 P.2d 499, 500–02 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948).
87 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164–65 (1878).
88 The Supreme Court offered a lengthy and detailed discussion of the history of
bigamy and polygamy as criminal offenses in medieval Spain and the Spanish posses-
sions that would later become Louisiana in Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U.S. 553 (1860),
which shows the political tensions inherent in morphing bigamy and polygamy from
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States after long having been converted into only an ecclesiastic
offense.89
A similar history of an ecclesiastic offense becoming civil was
relied on by the Supreme Court in its 1986 decision upholding
Georgia’s criminal law against sodomy, Bowers v. Hardwick.90 In
overturning Bowers, the Supreme Court called into doubt that long-
standing history as it related to restricting only sex among queer
people, and stated that, even if the historical reality were as the
Bowers opinion described, a long history did not make sodomy bans
constitutional as applied to consensual queer sex between adults.91
In doing so, Justice Kennedy quoted the Supreme Court’s decision
in a case protecting the right to abortion: “Our obligation is to
define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”92
Tellingly, since the fervor of 19th-century anti-Mormonism has
waned, so have prosecutions for living in plural marriage, with gov-
ernment officials focusing on fighting the other crimes stereotypi-
cally associated with communities where plural marriage is
common.93 The Senate Judiciary Committee recently reviewed evi-
dence of the crimes “not unusually attendant to the practice of”
plural marriage in the American West cited by the Green court as a
valid reason to limit marital rights, yet no one suggested the family
form itself, rather than the isolation inherent to certain fundamen-
talist Mormon communities, is responsible for their supposed
criminality.94
In short, there seems to be little justification to keep one per-
son from having multiple marriages other than to protect monoga-
mous marriage by expressing moral disapproval of other family
canonical heresies (tried by the Inquisition along with such abominable acts as sor-
cery, Judaism, and Mahomedanism) to civil crimes. Id. at 580–88.
89 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164–65. In fact, the English statute transforming bigamy into
a civil crime, referred to in Reynolds as adopted in 1788 by the legislature of Virginia,
may have been Kentucky’s original law on bigamy, given that when Kentucky became
independent of Virginia in 1792, it adopted all general Virginia laws that were not
inconsistent with its new constitution. See An Act Concerning the Erection of the Dis-
trict of Kentucky into an Independent State (Approved Dec. 18, 1789), Compact with
Virginia; KY. CONST. art. VIII § 6 (1792).
90 See 478 U.S. 186, 196–97 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
91 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567–73 (2003).
92 Id. at 571; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 850 (1992) (plurality opinion).
93 Jaime M. Gher, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage - Allies or Adversaries Within the
Same-Sex Marriage Movement, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 559, 578–80 (2008).
94 See Crimes Associated with Polygamy: The Need for a Coordinated State and Federal Re-
sponse: Hearing on S. 3313 Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 5–8 (2008)
(statement of Sen. Harry Reid) (quoting State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 830 (Utah
2004)).
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types.95 Given the history of barring plural marriage as both an im-
pediment to marriage and a crime to express moral disapproval for
non-monogamy, to restrain specific religious practices, and to pro-
mote a majoritarian view of what constitutes proper civilized cul-
ture, a state might have difficulty in sustaining, under a purely legal
analysis, that it has any bona fide, constitutionally permissible inter-
ests in maintaining restraints on plural marriage.96
However, as the Utah cases demonstrate, courts—for whatever
reason—have not yet been receptive to that analysis. The princi-
ples in Windsor expand language in Lawrence about the illegitimacy
of moral disapproval as a government interest by applying it di-
rectly to marriage. Despite this fact, it seems unlikely that a court
would find that there is not some sufficiently important govern-
mental interest stemming from the prohibition on plural marriage
to keep me from exercising my right to marry a woman. As such,
Kentucky might be able to clear this hurdle.
B. The Relationship Between Kentucky’s Interests and Its Interference
Though Kentucky might be found to have a sufficiently impor-
tant interest in protecting against plural marriages to sustain its
ban on that practice generally, denying marriage licenses to those
who are in marriages void under Kentucky law, or prosecuting
them for bigamy, would have to be closely tailored to give effect to
only those interests. Tactically, because I am only looking for the
narrow relief of ensuring that I have a right to marry a woman and
not seeking to invalidate bans on plural marriage totally, I would
focus on challenging the state’s actions as applied to my case.97 In
State v. Green, the Utah Supreme Court was eager to point out how
Utah’s interests in preventing the “crimes not unusually attendant
to” the practice of plural marriage were vindicated in prosecuting
the defendant. The court noted that Green’s conviction for bigamy
95 Maura Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV 353,
429–31 (2003).
96 See Stephanie Forbes, Comment, “Why Just Have One?”: An Evaluation of the Anti-
Polygamy Laws Under the Establishment Clause, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1517, 1540–47 (2003);
James Askew, Note, The Slippery Slope: The Vitality of Reynolds v. U.S. after Romer and
Lawrence, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 627, 647–51 (2006).
97 As-applied challenges allow courts to give narrow relief, which may be better
suited to a strange case about the right to marry in an environment dominated by the
Roberts Court’s perceived preference for a limited role for the judiciary. See Gillian E.
Metzger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts Court, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
773, 796–98 (2009); see generally Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer S. Rosenberg, Defacing
Democracy?: The Changing Nature and Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the Su-
preme Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1644 (2009).
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accompanied convictions for rape of a child and nonpayment of
child support.98 The court further noted the levels of incest pre-
sent in Green’s marriages.99 To keep Green from having the consti-
tutional right to be married to multiple women, in his case, clearly
vindicated Utah’s interests in limiting plural marriage in the first
place by protecting women and children from criminalities the
court posited are associated with plural marriage.
However, no such facts would exist in my case. I would not be
asking for the right to have multiple, concurrent marriages recog-
nized as valid in Kentucky. I would not be seeking to live on a sepa-
ratist compound with multiple, consanguineous wives under the
age of consent. The only right I would be asking for is to have one
marriage to a woman under Kentucky law, like any other Kentucky
man whom the state deems unmarried has a right to have. There is
no rational relationship, much less a closely tailored relationship,
to vindicating a state’s interest in preventing the exploitation of
women and minors in such a situation.
My case also lacks any concern about wasting state benefits or
implicating a state’s potentially compelling interest in maintaining
a vast network of laws predicated on monogamy.100 Kentucky
would not have to accord any rights to my New York marriage to
my husband; the only rights and obligations arising from marriage
would be from my Kentucky marriage to a woman. I would not be
able to defraud the state from benefits or abuse state rights stem-
ming from multiple marriages as the Utah court presumed that
Green might.101 Kentucky’s interests in keeping any wide swath of
benefits it might suppose only belong to monogamous couples
would not be threatened by my asking to have access to those bene-
fits for only one marriage.
The only perhaps sufficiently important interest to be vindi-
cated by denying me a marriage is to protect the traditional mean-
ing of marriage as a monogamous institution. Even that reason
would fail in this case, however, because I would not be validly mar-
ried to two people. Under Kentucky law, I would only be validly
married to one woman. Especially since I am not arguing that Ken-
tucky must recognize both marriages, but only that it must recog-
nize the type of marriage I am entitled to contract under Kentucky
law and which is recognized under federal constitutional law as a
98 Green, 99 P.3d at 830 n.14.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 830.
101 Id.
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fundamental right, Kentucky does not advance its interests in de-
fending traditional, opposite-sex, monogamous marriage by refus-
ing to allow me to enter into one. While the state may want to keep
me from having concurrent marital relationships as a means of
protecting traditional morality about what marriage looks like,
Windsor promotes the argument that the government has no legiti-
mate interest in protecting and promoting one definition of mar-
riage for only that reason.102 Denying me a marriage license to
enter into, or punishing me for entering into, an opposite-sex, mo-
nogamous marriage does not advance the types of interests that,
based on prior cases, Kentucky is likely to put forth in interfering
with my fundamental right to opposite-sex marriage.
CONCLUSION: WHY DO THESE QUESTIONS MATTER?
Despite the weight of the legal analysis, I cannot say with confi-
dence that any court would go along with my plan to marry a wo-
man in Kentucky. Even with all the law on my side, a court would
probably find a way to allow Kentucky to interfere with my funda-
mental right to marry a woman based on a marriage to a man that
it would otherwise refuse to recognize. Such was the state of the
fundamental right to marry when Windsor was handed down.103
102 Cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693–96 (2013).
103 Of course, in the time since I wrote this Note on conflict of laws on marital
status in July 2013, a lot has happened in the world of same-sex marriage recognition.
Federal courts in Illinois, Ohio, Virginia, Oklahoma, and Utah have all decided, citing
to Windsor, that state refusals to recognize or grant same-sex marriages are unconstitu-
tional. See Bostic v. Rainey, No. 13cv395, 2014 WL 561978 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2014)
(applying facially to any Virginia law, the Commonwealth’s constitution included,
which bars granting or recognizing same-sex marriages); Bishop v. United States ex rel.
Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 2014 WL 116013 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2014) (apply-
ing to all enforcement of the Oklahoma Constitution’s same-sex marriage amend-
ment, which limited marriages to opposite-sex couples); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, No.
13-CV-501, 2013 WL 6726688 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 23, 2013) (as applied to Ohio’s refusal
to recognize valid out-of-state marriages between same-sex couples on state death cer-
tificates); Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 13-CV-217, 2013 WL 6697874 (D. Utah Dec. 20,
2013), judgment stayed pending appeal, Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (Jan. 6, 2014)
(striking down Utah’s Amendment 3, which prohibits same-sex marriage); Lee v. Orr,
No. 13-CV-8719, 2013 WL 6490577 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2013) (allowing class of termi-
nally ill patients to marry their same-sex partners earlier than the effective date of the
statute permitting same-sex marriage by issuing preliminary injunctive relief); Gray v.
Orr, No. 13 C 8449, 2013 WL 6355918 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 2013) (same as Lee, but as
applied to only one same-sex couple where one partner was terminally ill); Obergefell
v. Kasich, No. 13-CV-501, 2013 WL 3814262 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013) (as applied to
the state’s refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages from other states to denote a
surviving spouse’s marital status on a death certificate). Yes, even Kentucky’s restric-
tions on marriage have been invalidated by a federal court in a way that could, if the
case is upheld on appeal, completely render this Note meaningless much sooner than
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Nevertheless, analogy shows that it is critical that we as legal
technicians interrogate and flesh out these seemingly silly ques-
tions about the limits of our fundamental rights. Determining the
“essentials” of the sport of golf for the purposes of accommodating
people with disabilities seemed “silly” to Justice Scalia.104 His dis-
sent in that case has been characterized as outraged at the fact that
the Supreme Court was being asked to figure out how to accommo-
date people with disabilities in a competitive sport under the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act.105 Justice Scalia’s opinion reflects a
deep, ableist privilege: it is silly for people who can play golf with-
out accommodation to reflect on how to include those who need
it.
Straight married couples all over the United States have centu-
ries of case law, endless statutes and regulations, and a wealth of
cultural and historical knowledge that map out exactly what their
marriages, celebrated in one state, mean in another state. Of all
the privileges that inhere to living a straight life, one of them is
knowing that moving to another state does not put one’s legal
rights into limbo. Queers do not share that privilege. While the
questions covered in this analysis might seem silly, figuring out
what the limits of our fundamental rights are, as they are in a state
of flux, has never been more important.
I had hoped. See Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13-CV-750-H, 2014 WL 556729 (W.D. Ky.
Feb. 12, 2014) (deciding, just in time for Valentine’s Day, that Kentucky’s refusal to
recognize valid out-of-state same-sex marriages—such as mine—violates the Four-
teenth Amendment). See also David S. Cohen & Dahlia Lithwick, It’s Over: Gay Marriage
Can’t Lose in the Courts, SLATE (Feb. 14, 2014, 10:43 AM), http://www.slate.com/arti
cles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/02/virginia_vs_gay_marriage_ban_
ruled_unconstitutional_a_perfect_record_for.single.html (providing an accessible
run-down of the changes Windsor has brought to the constitutional discussion in case
law of same-sex marriage in America). As Judge John G. Heyburn II pointed out:
“[S]ometime in the next few years at least one other Supreme Court opinion will
likely complete this judicial journey.” Bourke, 2014 WL 556729, at *12. However, we
can be certain that questions of marital status, marriage recognition, and the legal
doctrines surrounding the family will continue to evolve long past the time when I am
considered married in Kentucky.
104 See PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 700 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105 Aviam Soifer, Disabling the ADA: Essences, Better Angels, and Unprincipled Neutrality
Claims, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1285, 13005 (2003).
